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Repudiating the Narrowing Rule  
in Capital Sentencing 
Scott W. Howe* 
This Article proposes a modest reform of Eighth Amendment law 
governing capital sentencing to spur major reform in the understanding 
of the function of the doctrine. The Article urges the Supreme Court to 
renounce a largely empty mandate known as the “narrowing” rule and 
the rhetoric of equality that has accompanied it. By doing so, the Court 
could speak more truthfully about the important but more limited 
function that its capital-sentencing doctrine actually pursues, which is to 
ensure that no person receives the death penalty who does not deserve it. 
The Court could also speak more candidly than it has since Furman v. 
Georgia about the problem of inequality that has continued to pervade 
capital selection. If the Court remains unwilling to strike down unequal 
death-penalty systems, it should acknowledge the inequality and explain 
that the problem addressed by the Eighth Amendment is not 
inconsistency but retributive excess. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has declared that the Eighth Amendment 
imposes two mandates on capital sentencing. First, a death-penalty 
scheme must “rationally narrow the class of death-eligible 
defendants . . . .”1 Second, it must “at the sentencing phase allow[] for 
the consideration of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of 
discretion.”2 The body of doctrine that reflects these mandates stems 
from the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,3 in which the Court struck 
 
  Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Chapman University School of Law. I 
thank my colleagues at Chapman University School of Law, particularly Celeste McConville, 
Richard Redding, and Dean Tom Campbell. Most importantly, I thank Jetty Maria Howe for 
assistance at all stages of the project. 
 1. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006). 
 2. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988); see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 174 (stating 
that a capital punishment scheme must “permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing 
determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the 
circumstances of his crime”). 
 3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
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down capital sentencing as it then existed, and the quintet of 1976 cases, 
in which the Court upheld three new death-penalty schemes and struck 
down two others.4 
Among students of capital-sentencing law, both opponents and 
proponents of the death penalty generally view the doctrine as grievously 
flawed.5 Opponents frequently argue that the doctrine is “unresponsive to 
the central animating concerns that inspired the Court to embark on its 
regulatory regime in the first place,”6 which was the “arbitrary and 
discriminatory imposition of death . . . .”7 Proponents emphasize that the 
doctrine unduly interferes, for no apparent purpose, with states’ decisions 
about how to structure death-penalty trials.8 Commentators from both 
camps generally agree that the law embodies a confusing and debilitating 
tension between “consistency,” which is the purported goal of the first 
mandate, and “individualized consideration,” which is the asserted goal 
of the second one.9 
 
 4. The decision in all five cases was issued on July 2, 1976. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
U.S. 325 (1976) (striking down a statute that mandated the death penalty for first-degree murderers); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down a statute that mandate the death 
penalty for first-degree murderers); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding against a facial 
challenge a statute that restricted the definition of capital murder and, at a sentencing hearing, 
required the jury to answer three special questions affirmatively before a death sentence could be 
imposed); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding against a facial challenge a statute 
requiring a judge, after a jury recommendation, to find at least one statutory aggravating factor and 
to weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors before deciding to impose a death sentence 
on a convicted murderer); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding against a facial 
challenge a statute that required a jury or judge to find at least one statutory aggravating factor and to 
consider aggravating and mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence). 
 5. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 288 (2002); Carol 
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 357–59 (1995). 
 6. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 359. 
 7. Id. at 358. 
 8. See BANNER, supra note 5, at 288 (“Critics on the right complained that the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence forced state governments to spend time and money for no good 
purpose.”); see also Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995) (“The established application of the Eighth Amendment to the 
administration of the death penalty will continue to give opponents a legitimate platform from which 
to impede even the most determined efforts to carry out the death penalty on a routine basis.”). There 
also can be no doubt that developing and enforcing the doctrine has required an enormous 
investment of time and resources by the federal courts. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Capital 
Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture of Death,” 34 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 861 
(2008). 
 9. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 287 (noting “the Court’s constant effort to reconcile 
two irreconcilable goals”); NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 137 (2011) (asserting that 
2.HOWE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:57 PM 
1477 The Narrowing Rule in Capital Sentencing 
 1479 
This Article urges a reform to resolve claims that capital-sentencing 
doctrine is simultaneously meaningless, overly complex, and at war with 
itself. The proposal will satisfy neither committed opponents nor ardent 
proponents of capital punishment, because it would preserve the most 
important part of existing doctrine and thus, neither assure equality in the 
distribution of death sentences nor avoid interference with state decisions 
on how to structure death-sentencing deliberations. While the proposal 
offers only a modest reform to existing doctrine, it also aims to alter 
substantially the existing rhetoric regarding capital sentencing’s central 
goal, allowing a more truthful account to blossom. I contend that the 
Court should abandon the first mandate, regarding narrowing, and end 
the rhetoric about consistency that has accompanied it. At the same time, 
the Court should preserve the second mandate, regarding mitigating 
evidence and sentencer discretion, and articulate the deeper rationale that 
justifies it, which is not simply “individualized consideration,” but a 
“deserts limitation”—the notion that no person should receive a death 
sentence who does not deserve it.10 
I previously have argued that the Court should have avoided 
altogether the regulation of capital-sentencing trials under the Eighth 
Amendment.11 In Furman or in the 1976 cases, the Court could have 
begun to foreclose the use of the death penalty in certain categorical 
situations, such as for rape, but otherwise left states to decide how to 
structure capital-sentencing decisions.12 Alternatively, the Court could 
have held the death penalty impermissible as cruel and unusual 
punishment, except perhaps for rare and egregious crimes against the 
 
capital-sentencing law embodies an “obvious tension”); Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The 
Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 520–21 (1991) (describing an “inherent 
tension” in the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 370 
(noting “some tension” between the individualization mandate and the consistency aspiration). 
Even among the Justices, there is substantial agreement that the two mandates pose a 
“tension.” See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008) (“The tension . . . has produced 
results not altogether satisfactory.”). Justice Blackmun concluded at the end of his career that the 
inability to achieve both goals justified judicial abolition. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 
1147–49 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari). Other Justices have 
contended that the tension justifies evisceration of the second mandate, particularly because that 
requirement purportedly lacks grounding in the Eighth Amendment. See infra notes 178–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 10. See Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-
Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 797 (1998). 
 11. See id. at 797–98. 
 12. See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 438–43 (2001). 
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state or against humanity.13 My contention that the Court should have 
avoided regulating capital-sentencing trials stems not from the absence 
of an Eighth Amendment rationale for it. Indeed, I believe that the Eighth 
Amendment should prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on those 
who do not deserve it and that the capital sentencer should follow this 
principle in reaching its sentencing verdict.14 The problem for the Court 
stems from the inability of the Justices to translate this deserts limitation 
into sufficiently specific rules to make Eighth Amendment regulation of 
the sentencing trial effective.15 For this very reason, the Court’s capital-
sentencing doctrine, even if understood through the prism of the deserts 
limitation, has produced benefits of uncertain value.16 
Putting aside arguments for deregulation or abolition, however, the 
narrowing rule warrants repudiation. First, while the individualization 
mandate can be understood as an imperfect effort to protect against 
undeserved death sentences, the narrowing rule is too inconsequential to 
merit continuance. The narrowing rule as constructed does not coherently 
pursue any goal required by the Constitution.17 Second, since the 
articulation of the narrowing rule in 1976, the Court has overlapped it 
with decisions directly restricting death eligibility. The Court’s decisions 
proscribing the death penalty for certain categories of crimes and 
offenders has rendered the narrowing rule obsolete. 
The third reason to renounce the narrowing requirement is the most 
important. Repudiation would help the Court speak more forthrightly 
about the purpose of the Eighth Amendment as it applies to capital 
 
 13. See Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the 
Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2083 (2004) (explaining the Eighth Amendment argument for abolition based on 
disproportionality). 
 14. See Howe, supra note 10, at 797. 
 15. See id. at 828–29. 
 16. See id. at 862; see also LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF 
BELIEF 150–51 (1996) (noting the absence of “a good theory about desert and free will” that can lead 
to consensus about how to judge the deserved punishment of a murderer). 
 17. The Court could try to re-explain the narrowing rule as serving the goal of ensuring that 
only the deserving receive the death penalty. See Howe, supra note 10, at 833; see also David 
McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence According 
to the Court’s Own Goals: Mild Success or Major Disaster? 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545, 577 (1997) 
(noting that while the “winnowing effect” of Georgia’s narrowing effort was “not huge, neither 
[was] it de minimis” and that this effect helped to define some undeserving defendants “out of the 
death-eligible pool”). While voluntary state narrowing, if significant and well considered, could help 
further the deserts limitation, I contend, in Parts II through IV, that the narrowing mandate as 
articulated by the Court is so incoherent and, in Part V, that its negative consequences are so 
substantial that the Court should renounce it. 
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sentencing. The narrowing mandate did not stem from a sensible view 
about how the Eighth Amendment could regulate robust death-penalty 
systems. It arose from an implausible theory the Court used in 1976 both 
to uphold new death-penalty statutes and to assert allegiance to Furman, 
a decision in which only three of the Justices were even beginning to 
consider Eighth Amendment principles for a regulatory regime.18 In 
1976, the Court asserted that Furman had called for “reasonable 
consistency” in the use of the death penalty and that some of the new 
systems, by providing for protections that included narrowing, achieved 
that end.19 In reality, consistency according to offender deserts is 
impossible to achieve except through abolition and, in any event, the 
narrowing effect that the new statutes provided was too minimal and 
haphazard to promote consistency.20 Yet, for decades, the Court has 
continued to offer the consistency rationale for the narrowing mandate 
with the suggestion that reasonable consistency has been assured.21 This 
account has bred confusion over what the Eighth Amendment demands 
and deep disillusionment with the Court among many who correctly 
recognize that the distribution of death sentences among capital 
offenders, while not as egregious as in the pre-Furman era,22 has 
remained highly arbitrary and often racially discriminatory.23 This 
account also has obscured the truth about inequality for those who are 
not predisposed to recognize it. 
The Court should stop perpetuating the story that the Eighth 
Amendment demands reasonable consistency in the use of the sanction 
and that the narrowing rule helps to assure it. The Court has not taken the 
consistency goal seriously, and the narrowing rule has served mostly to 
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment, 
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.) (contending that the new Georgia statute, by requiring the 
finding of an aggravating circumstance as a prerequisite to a death sentence, would help promote 
“reasonable consistency”); id. at 196–98 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (noting that the 
new Georgia statute “narrow[s] the class of murderers subject to capital punishment” and asserting 
that this protection, among others, meant that there should be “non-discriminatory application”). 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 54–91. 
 22. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 17, at 548 (“In fact, the best available evidence strongly 
suggests that post-Furman systems are operating less arbitrarily . . . .”). 
 23. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (asserting that in upholding the Georgia 
system in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), in the face of statistics revealing racial bias in 
the distribution of death sentences, the majority’s opinion was “grievously flawed,” was comparable 
“to Plessy and Korematsu,” “repressed the truth,” and was “detestable”). 
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breed confusion and disappointment. As long as the Court continues to 
regulate capital trials under the Eighth Amendment, it should declare 
forthrightly that the central aim is to prevent undeserved death sentences 
and should maintain not the first requirement but the second, regarding 
mitigating evidence, which more strongly connects with the deserts 
limitation. 
My project proceeds in four stages. Part II briefly recounts how the 
narrowing requirement began to emerge in the 1976 cases and was 
perpetuated in the Court’s subsequent decisions. Part III demonstrates 
that the narrowing requirement has been constitutionally inconsequential 
as an effort to assure reasonable consistency in the distribution of death 
sentences and that the Court cannot effectively reform the requirement to 
serve that end. Part IV demonstrates that, since 1976, the grounds for 
requiring death-penalty systems to narrow the death-eligible group also 
have been overtaken by various Court decisions directly restricting death 
eligibility. Finally, Part V explains how repudiation of the narrowing 
requirement would assist the Court in accepting and acknowledging the 
deserts-limitation theory that actually underlies its decisions restricting 
death eligibility and regulating capital-sentencing trials. 
II. THE ORIGINS AND PERPETUATION OF THE NARROWING 
MANDATE 
The narrowing requirement grew out of efforts within the Supreme 
Court in 1976 to portray several new death-penalty statutes as congruous 
with Furman, and the Court has continued to adhere to that original 
version of congruence. A puzzling five-to-four decision in which all nine 
Justices wrote separate opinions,24 Furman was generally understood to 
strike down, under the Eighth Amendment, the standardless capital-
sentencing schemes that then prevailed. However, the decision created 
confusion and left the country “in an uncertain limbo” about the future of 
the death penalty.25 In 1976, the Court declared Furman a strike against 
inequality, although not a blow mandating abolition.26 The narrowing 
rule arose because the Court could say that the three new systems that it 
upheld in 1976, unlike those that it had invalidated in Furman, narrowed 
the class of offenders who were subject to the death penalty, which was 
 
 24. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 25. See id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 26. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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an attribute that the Court declared in turn to promote consistency.27 The 
Justices have perpetuated this consistency account for the narrowing rule 
in many subsequent decisions up through the recent past. 
A. Furman’s Ambiguity 
The Furman decision appeared to be an abrupt about-face from 
decisions that the Court had rendered only a year earlier. The ruling 
embodied three capital cases, two from Georgia and one from Texas.28 
The inmate from Texas, Elmer Branch, and one of the inmates from 
Georgia, Lucious Jackson, had received the death penalty for rape.29 
William Furman had received that sanction in Georgia for murder.30 All 
of the defendants were black, and all of the victims were white.31 The 
statutes under which the defendants were sentenced contained no 
standards for deciding when to impose death, and no standards were 
provided to the sentencers.32 The Georgia defendants were also subjected 
to a unitary trial in which the jury heard evidence and deliberated on the 
questions of guilt and punishment simultaneously.33 One year earlier, in 
McGautha v. California,34 and a companion case, Crampton v. Ohio,35 
the Court had rejected arguments that standardless capital sentencing and 
unitary trials violated the Constitution.36 However, the Court seemed to 
disavow at least some aspect of those decisions in Furman. 
The meaning of the Furman decision was unclear.37 In striking down 
the death sentences in a one paragraph, per curiam opinion, the majority 
 
 27. See infra notes 56–67 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972). 
 29. See id. at 239. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia, Not an End, But a Beginning, in DEATH 
PENALTY STORIES 95, 96 (John H. Blume & Jordan M Steiker eds., 2009). 
 32. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that, in each case, “the 
determination of whether the penalty should be death or a lighter punishment was left by the State to 
the discretion of the judge or of the jury”). 
 33. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 95. 
 34. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 196–208 (rejecting the argument against standardless capital sentencing); id. at 
208–20 (rejecting the argument against unitary capital trials). 
 37. At one level, the explanation is clear. Two Justices changed their minds. In McGautha, 
Stewart and White had been among six Justices, including Harlan, Burger, Blackmun, and Black, 
who had rejected the due process challenge. See id. at 184. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall 
had dissented. See id. In Furman, Stewart and White changed positions and, along with Douglas, 
Brennan, and Marshall, supported the per curiam opinion for the Court. See 408 U.S. at 240. The 
2.HOWE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1484 
said little more than that “the imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”38 The five 
concurring opinions, none of which received the endorsement of another 
Justice, failed to illuminate an underlying, controlling principle. Justices 
Brennan and Marshall each concluded that the death penalty was per se 
cruel and unusual.39 The other three concurring Justices asserted that the 
Georgia and Texas death-penalty systems violated the Eighth 
Amendment in operation. Justice Douglas said the systems allowed for 
improper discrimination.40 Justice Stewart said they allowed the death 
penalty to be imposed on “a capriciously selected random handful” of 
persons who committed capital crimes41 and thus produced punishment 
that was “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by 
lightning is cruel and unusual.”42 Justice White said the systems allowed 
the death penalty to be “exacted with great infrequency” and provided 
“no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”43 Without specifying 
what kind of reforms, if any, could suffice, these three opinions left open 
the possibility that new death-penalty statutes might pass constitutional 
muster. Considering the five concurring opinions together, Furman 
seemed to prohibit discriminatory, arbitrary, or discretionary systems. 
Anxiety over racial bias seemed to play a large role in the decision.44 
Although some observers, and perhaps a majority of the Justices, 
thought Furman would cause most death-penalty states to abandon 
 
dissenters were Burger, Blackmun, Powell (who had replaced Black), and Rehnquist (who had 
replaced Harlan). See id. 
 38. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
 39. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 40. See id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that “these discretionary statutes . . . 
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of 
equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments”). 
 41. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 309. 
 43. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 44. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Furman v. Georgia was decided in an atmosphere suffused with concern about race bias in the 
administration of the death penalty . . . .”); BANNER, supra note 5, at 290 (describing race 
discrimination as “the silent specter” that had prompted the Court’s condemnation of standardless 
sentencing); see also Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1795 (1987) (“From its very beginning, the charge of racism in the 
administration of the death penalty was often the text and always the subtext of the abolitionist 
litigative campaign.”). 
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capital punishment, the decision sparked a fierce public backlash and a 
frenzy of new legislation.45 Within four years, thirty-five states enacted 
revised death-penalty systems.46 Based on the perceived need to avoid 
inequality and infrequency in the use of the death sanction, a large 
majority of the new statutes simply required the death penalty for 
conviction of a capital offense.47 A much smaller group provided for 
bifurcated capital trials and sentencing standards.48 The states varied on 
whether they applied the death penalty to crimes other than murder and, 
with respect to murder, in how narrowly they defined the capital crime.49 
In states that required bifurcated trials, the standards provided for the 
sentencing hearing differed but were generally patterned on an American 
Law Institute proposal50 from the early 1960s,51 although the Court had 
criticized that approach in McGautha.52 These varied responses 
underscored the uncertainty over the meaning of Furman. At the same 
time, the totality of new legislation demonstrated that, if popular support 
for the death penalty had waned by 1972, Furman itself had sparked a 
resurgence.53 
B. The 1976 Cases: Narrowing for Consistency 
In the 1976 cases, the narrowing requirement began to emerge as 
part of a determination within the Court to uphold new death-penalty 
statutes while asserting allegiance to Furman. The manifestation of 
overwhelming public support for the death penalty after Furman 
undermined any claim that American society had come to view the 
sanction as altogether inhumane. Influenced by this demonstration,54 a 
 
 45. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 102–07. 
 46. See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive 
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 226, 238 
tbl.1 (1986). 
 47. See id. at 227, 252 tbl.3 (indicating that 22 states enacted mandatory-death statutes). 
 48. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1699–1709 (1974). 
 49. See Poulos, supra note 46, at 227, 248 tbl.2. 
 50. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The members of the 
American Law Institute recently voted to disavow the provision because of insurmountable obstacles 
to ensuring the fair administration of the penalty. See Adam Liptak, Shapers of Death Penalty Give 
Up on Their Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A11. 
 51. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (McKinney 1967) (adopting Model Penal Code’s 
approach to sentencing hearings). 
 52. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 206–08 (1971). 
 53. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 103–04. 
 54. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
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majority of the Justices in 1976 concluded that the Court should uphold 
the death penalty in some circumstances.55 The Court did strike down 
two mandatory death systems on grounds, among others, that they 
improperly denied a defendant the opportunity to present mitigating 
evidence.56 However, the Court upheld three new death systems 
requiring bifurcated trials on the theory that they promoted consistency, 
which the Court asserted was the mandate of Furman.57 
Each of the three systems that the Court approved—from Georgia, 
Florida, and Texas—appeared to reduce the group of capital offenders 
who were death eligible. Before a court could impose a death sentence in 
Georgia and Florida, the capital sentencer had to find at least one 
aggravating circumstance from a statutory list; only then could the 
sentencer consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances that 
might support a potential death sentence.58 Texas limited the definition 
of the capital offense to certain aggravated murders, thus narrowing the 
death-eligible group at the guilt-or-innocence proceeding before the 
sentencing phase commenced.59 
In the 1976 cases, the Court highlighted the narrowing aspect of the 
three systems as a feature that promoted consistency. The Court 
contended that reducing the death-eligible group to certain highly 
culpable offenders would likely cause prosecutors and sentencers to 
 
AMERICAN AGENDA 66–67 (1986) (“Two phenomena appear to have strongly influenced Justices 
Stewart and White: the impact of Furman on public opinion and the legislative response to 
Furman.”). 
 55. By 1976, seven Justices were prepared to uphold the death penalty in some 
circumstances, which meant that three Justices from the Furman majority were not voting to strike 
down all of the new statutes. Justice White, part of the majority in Furman, voted to uphold all of the 
statutes before the Court in 1976. Justice Stewart, part of the majority in Furman, voted to uphold 
the death penalty in three of those systems. Likewise, Justice Douglas, part of the majority in 
Furman, was replaced by Justice Stevens, who voted to uphold the same three statutes as Justice 
Stewart in 1976. See Poulos, supra note 46, at 227–35. 
 56. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 57. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, 
JJ.); id. at 222 (White, J., concurring); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251–53 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 260–61 (White, J., concurring); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 
276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 278–79 (White, J., concurring). 
 58. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165–66 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (discussing 
the operation of the new Georgia statute); id. at 222 (White, J., concurring); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 
251–53 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (discussing the operation of the new Florida 
statute); id. at 260–61 (White, J., concurring). 
 59. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271, 276 (1976) (discussing the operation of the new 
Texas statute); id. at 278 (White, J., concurring). 
2.HOWE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:57 PM 
1477 The Narrowing Rule in Capital Sentencing 
 1487 
regularly favor the death penalty for those who were deemed to fall 
within the death-eligible category.60 If a statute could define a death-
eligible class that would cover the most death-deserving offenders, the 
narrowing strategy, at least in theory, could also produce substantial 
consistency in the use of the death penalty. 
This point was most explicit in the opinions in Gregg v. Georgia.61 
A plurality of three Justices—Stewart, Powell, and Stevens—wrote that 
the narrowing function of the Georgia statute helped to ensure that 
sentencing discretion “is controlled by clear and objective standards so as 
to produce non-discriminatory application.”62 They asserted that a 
finding of a statutory aggravator “channeled” and “circumscribed” the 
decision of the sentencing jury63 and thereby helped ensure a 
“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death 
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”64 Justice 
White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, concurred 
on the importance of the narrowing function. He asserted that, if 
application of the death penalty is limited to the worst murders, as it was 
“in Georgia by reason of the aggravating-circumstance requirement, it 
becomes reasonable to expect that juries—even given discretion not to 
impose the death penalty—will impose the death penalty in a substantial 
portion of the cases so defined.”65 White also asserted that prosecutors 
would almost always pursue the death penalty when they could prove 
murder plus an aggravating circumstance.66 Thus, he concluded that 
there was “reason to expect” that Georgia’s new system would avoid 
“the infirmities which invalidated its previous system under Furman.”67 
C. Narrowing for Consistency After 1976 
Since 1976, the Court has continued to tout the narrowing rule as the 
central antidote to the infirmities that justified the Furman decision. In 
 
 60. See, e.g., Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (asserting, regarding the new 
Florida statute, that there was “good reason to anticipate, then, that as to certain categories of 
murderers, the penalty will not be imposed freakishly or rarely but will be imposed with regularity”). 
 61. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. 
 62. Id. at 197–98 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 
S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)). 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 206–07. 
 64. Id. at 198 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
 65. Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. at 225. 
 67. Id. at 222. 
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two subsequent decisions, the Court rejected state-court applications of 
particular statutory aggravators as unduly vague and, thus, inadequate to 
narrow the death-eligible group. While the Court has not further applied 
the narrowing rule to reject a state-court judgment supporting a death 
sentence, it has frequently reiterated that the rule ensures the consistency 
required by Furman. 
The Court rejected statutory aggravators for inadequate narrowing in 
Godfrey v. Georgia68 and Maynard v. Cartwright.69 In Godfrey, the 
Court focused on a Georgia statutory aggravator that asked whether the 
offense “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that 
it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the 
victim.”70 In Cartwright, an Oklahoma aggravator at issue asked whether 
the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”71 In neither 
case had the state courts applied a narrowing construction of the 
aggravator.72  
 The Supreme Court rejected the application of the Georgia provision 
on grounds that a “person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize 
almost every murder” to satisfy it.73 The Court rejected the application of 
the Oklahoma provision on the same basis, noting that it left the jury 
“with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid” in 
Furman.74 In both cases, the Court emphasized that narrowing was 
essential to help ensure a principled basis for distinguishing the few 
cases “in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in 
which it was not.”75 
In several later cases, the Court upheld state-court constructions of 
aggravating circumstances that were similar to those in Godfrey and 
Cartwright, but it continued to stress the importance of the narrowing 
rule.76 For example, in Walton v. Arizona77 and Lewis v. Jeffers,78 the 
 
 68. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
 69. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 
 70. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422 (plurality opinion) (quoting GA. CODE § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978) 
(recodified as GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (2012)). 
 71. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 359 (quoting OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (1981). 
 72. See id. at 360–61; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 430–32 (plurality opinion). 
 73. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428–29. 
 74. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 361–62. 
 75. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 (plurality opinion); Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 363 (quoting 
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433 (plurality opinion)). 
 76. In Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994), the Court rejected claims that aggravating 
factors specified in the California statute for consideration at a final selection stage of the sentencing 
process, rather than at the earlier stage for determining death-eligibility, were too vague. 
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Court upheld applications of an Arizona statutory aggravator that asked 
whether the murder was “committed ‘in an especially heinous, cruel or 
depraved manner.’”79 Likewise, in Arave v. Creech,80 the Court upheld 
the application of an Idaho statute that asked whether “[by] the murder, 
or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited 
utter disregard for human life.”81 In all three cases, the Court found that 
the state courts had provided a narrowing construction sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster.82 The Court also emphasized that the narrowing 
requirement plays “a significant role in channeling the sentencer’s 
discretion”83 and in providing “a principled basis” for distinguishing 
“those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not.”84 The 
function of the narrowing requirement, according to the Court, was “to 
ensure that the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational 
manner.”85 
Throughout the modern era, the Court has perpetuated the view that 
the Eighth Amendment demands reasonable consistency in the use of 
capital punishment and that the narrowing rule helps to assure that 
consistency.86 At times, the Court has said something less—that the 
Eighth Amendment demands merely that use of the penalty not be 
 
 77. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 78. 497 U.S. 764 (1990). 
 79. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989)); Jeffers, 
497 U.S. at 766 (quoting the same statute). 
 80. 507 U.S. 463 (1993). 
 81. Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. See Creech, 507 U.S. at 471–75, Walton, 497 U.S. at 654–55; Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 778–
80. 
 83. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 774. 
 84. Creech, 507 U.S. at 474; see also Walton, 497 U.S. at 655 (rejecting Walton’s claim that 
aggravator was “applied in an arbitrary manner and, as applied, does not distinguish his case from 
cases in which the death sentence has not been imposed”). 
 85. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 776 (quoting Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in judgment)). 
 86. The Court has asserted an Eighth Amendment goal of consistency or non-arbitrariness in 
capital sentencing on various occasions in addition to those already mentioned in this Part. See, e.g., 
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992) (asserting that “narrowing factors” protect against 
“arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death sentence”); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 
541 (1987) (“[D]eath penalty statutes [must] be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being 
administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 
(1982) (“Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional 
death penalty that would [promote] . . . measured, consistent application.”). 
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“wholly arbitrary”87 or not “wanton” or “freakish.”88 However, the Court 
frequently has asserted that the goal is something approaching equality 
and that the narrowing rule is the central means for achieving it.89 Only 
recently, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,90 the Court reiterated that the function 
of the narrowing rule is to “ensure consistency in determining who 
receives a death sentence.”91 
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE NARROWING MANDATE TO 
ACHIEVE REASONABLE CONSISTENCY 
Despite the narrowing requirement’s central role in the Court’s effort 
to articulate an underlying principle for modern capital-sentencing law, 
this rationale for congruence between Furman and the 1976 cases was 
always implausible. This Part contends that the Court should not have 
claimed that the post-Furman statutes, by narrowing death eligibility, 
achieved reasonable consistency in the use of the sanction and that 
inconsistency in its use was the problem that underlay Furman. The idea 
that the narrowing effect in the new statutes could promote consistency 
according to offender deserts was wildly unrealistic. This Part also 
demonstrates that the Court has not in the decades after 1976 enforced 
the narrowing mandate to require states to limit death eligibility in 
meaningful ways. Ultimately, the problem for the Court stems from its 
inability to define which category of offenders deserves the death 
penalty. 
Narrowing of the death-eligible class can never achieve anything 
approaching consistency according to offender deserts, except through 
abolition.92 Even extreme narrowing cannot produce equality.93 Assume, 
 
 87. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 488 
U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)). 
 88. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1989) (asserting that the death 
sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed (citation omitted)). 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 54–91. 
 90. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 91. Id. at 436. 
 92. The Court on one occasion seemed to concede this point. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318 
n.45 (contending that “narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants” could not eliminate racial 
inconsistency in the use of the death penalty). 
 93. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Forward: Evidence, Inference, Rules, and Judgment in 
Constitutional Adjudication: The Intriguing Case of Walton v. Arizona, 81 J. CRIM L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 727, 736–37 (1991) (explaining that, assuming one could understand what constitutes 
an “arbitrary” decision, although the total number of “arbitrary” death sentences could be reduced by 
reducing the number of cases processed as capital ones, the number of “arbitrary” life sentences 
could increase). 
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for example, that the penalty was reserved only for the assassination of 
certain high government officials and for terrorist attacks causing the 
death of ten or more persons. Criminals falling within the death-eligible 
class would likely receive the death penalty at a high rate, even if the 
death penalty remained discretionary with the sentencer, as required by 
the prohibition on mandatory death penalties.94 These crimes are 
sufficiently egregious that prosecutors and sentencers probably would 
favor the death penalty much of the time, regardless of the presence of 
other factors that might often influence decisionmakers to favor life 
imprisonment. However, extreme narrowing of this sort amounts to near 
abolition. These crimes rarely occur. Moreover, even such extreme 
narrowing would not produce consistency according to an offender’s 
deserts, because many equally death-deserving offenders would commit 
horrible crimes not captured by the definition of the death-eligible class, 
and some offenders who fell within the definition would still escape the 
sanction although they deserved it.95 The capital-selection process is 
filled with opportunities and pressures for prosecutors to spare offenders 
who deserve the death penalty, and at the guilt-or-innocence and 
sentencing stages, judges and juries also retain discretion to grant 
merciful reprieves.96 Despite the Court’s repeated rhetoric, narrowing 
cannot assure “that the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, 
rational manner”97 nor provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the 
few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed, from the many in which it is 
not.’”98 The only way to assure consistency in the use of the death 
penalty is to abolish it. 
Although the Court has at times described the goal as simply 
“reasonable” consistency,99 the Court also has not demanded that states 
narrow in the major way required to achieve even that more modest end. 
The Court long ago seemed to give up on any requirement that states 
avoid vague aggravators. In Walton v. Arizona100 and Lewis v. Jeffers,101 
 
 94. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
 95. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 93, at 736–37. 
 96. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 288 (discussing the many non-desert-based reasons 
that most offenders who appear death eligible escape the death sanction). 
 97. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 776 (1990) (quoting Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 98. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)). 
 99. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 100. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 101. 497 U.S. 764 (1990). 
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the Court relied on state court adoptions of purportedly limiting 
constructions to approve an Arizona aggravator that asked whether the 
murder was “committed ‘in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved 
manner.’”102 In Arave v. Creech,103 the Court relied on the same 
rationale to uphold an Idaho statute that asked whether “[by] the murder, 
or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited 
utter disregard for human life.”104 However, the limiting constructions 
seemed as vague as the statutory language. The Arizona Supreme Court 
had essentially required only that the killing appear “senseless,”105 and 
the Idaho Supreme Court had merely required that the killing be “cold-
blooded” and “pitiless.”106 Constructions of this kind, just like the vague 
statutory language, “invite an affirmative answer in every case.”107 
The Court also has not otherwise required states to limit the overall 
coverage of their death-penalty statutes to the degree necessary to pursue 
near-equality according to deserts. For example, after Furman, Georgia 
retained the death penalty “for six categories of crime: murder, 
kidnapping for ransom or where the victims is harmed, armed robbery, 
rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking.”108 Likewise, the aggravators in the 
new statute, taken together, covered the vast majority of those capital 
crimes.109 The most thorough and sophisticated study of the death 
 
 102. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-703(F)(6) (1989)); Jeffers, 
497 U.S. at 766 (quoting the same statute). 
 103. 507 U.S. 463 (1993). 
 104. Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1, 11–12 (Ariz. 1983). 
 106. State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981). 
 107. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 374. 
 108. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162–63 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) 
(footnotes omitted). In Gregg, the plurality emphasized that the Georgia Supreme Court had, in 
Gregg’s case and on several occasions since Furman, rejected the death penalty for armed robbery. 
See id. at 205–06. 
 109. The aggravating circumstances in the post-Furman Georgia statute were as follows: 
(1)The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person 
with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was 
committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal 
convictions. 
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the 
offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery, 
or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the 
commission of burglary or arson in the first degree. 
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery or kidnapping knowingly created a 
great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or 
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. 
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penalty conducted in any state—by the famous Baldus team—found that 
“more than 90 percent of the pre-Furman death sentences [in Georgia] 
were imposed in cases whose facts would have made them death-eligible 
under Georgia’s post-Furman statute.”110 Thus, any appearance of major 
narrowing was illusory. 
The Court also has not required that narrowing efforts focus on 
identifying the most death-deserving offenders. From a deserts 
perspective, aggravating factors that were included on Georgia’s 
statutory list made little sense in light of factors that were excluded. 
Shooting to death an important civil-rights leader out of racial hatred or 
to thwart her work was not a death-eligible offense, while committing a 
murder for pecuniary gain would render the offender death-eligible.111 
Why should such a horrible crime be excluded if such ordinary murders 
were covered? Shooting a small child, a severely handicapped man, or an 
elderly woman out of spite was not necessarily included, while killing 
during a robbery automatically rendered the offender death eligible.112 
Why was the perpetrator who assassinated a helpless person less culpable 
than the offender who committed one of the most common of murders? 
 
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose 
of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value. 
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or 
former district attorney or solicitor was committed during or because of the exercise of 
his official duty. 
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an 
agent or employee of another person. 
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an 
aggravated battery to the victim. 
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections 
employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties. 
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the 
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement. 
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or 
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or 
another. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975) (recodified as GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (2012)), 
quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1976). The statute also allowed that in cases of 
treason or aircraft hijacking, none of the statutory aggravating circumstances need be found as a 
prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty. See id. 
 110. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 102 (1990) 
[hereinafter BALDUS STUDY]. 
 111. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975) (recodified as GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
30(b)(7) (2012)). 
 112. See id. 
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The lack of good answers to these questions underscores that the 
statute’s minor narrowing effect was not tied to any reasonable measure 
of culpability.113 
Various other modern death-penalty systems based on the 1976 cases 
also fail to reduce significantly the death-eligible group so as to identify 
the most culpable offenders. The Supreme Court “has placed no outer 
limit on the number of aggravating factors that a state may adopt.”114 As 
a consequence, several states, like Georgia, specify ten or more 
aggravating circumstances that individually can support a death sentence 
and that together cover the vast majority of all capital offenses.115 
California, for example, currently specifies twenty-two categories of 
aggravating circumstances, some with multiple parts.116 Professor 
Gerald Uelmen has concluded that these special circumstances “can be 
applied to 87% of the murders committed in California.”117 Likewise, 
the federal death penalty applies to a broad array of offenses, including 
several nonhomicide crimes, and the list of aggravating circumstances 
that can render an offender death eligible is expansive.118 
In Georgia and states with similar systems, as in the pre-Furman era, 
many offenders are death eligible, but only a few receive death sentences 
and even fewer are executed.119 Most persons who are death eligible are 
reprieved by prosecutors and jurors for reasons that have nothing to do 
with whether they deserve the death penalty.120 A system so filled with 
 
 113. Some of the statutory aggravators were surely grounded in part on utilitarian 
considerations, such as the effort to deter future crimes. Yet, jurors may be less likely to sentence an 
offender to death on deterrence grounds than on grounds that he is highly culpable, which means that 
such aggravators will not tend to produce consistently high death-sentencing rates among the death 
eligible. For other reasons as well, I have argued that statutory aggravators defining death eligibility 
should describe egregious offender culpability rather than circumstances conforming to the state’s 
heightened desire to deter. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 13, at 2141–43. 
 114. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 374. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2 (West 2011). 
 117. Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California 
Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495, 497 (2010) (citing CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJ 
FinalReport.pdf); see also Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: 
Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (1997) (asserting that California’s death 
penalty scheme is “arguably the broadest such scheme in the country”). 
 118. See generally LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & SCOTT W. HOWE, 
UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 352–54 (2d ed. 2008). 
 119. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 375. 
 120. The Baldus researchers found, for example, that “in 59 percent of the death-eligible 
cases, a life sentence was imposed by default when the prosecutor unilaterally waived the penalty 
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opportunities for discretionary reprieves—through charging decisions, 
plea-bargaining decisions, decisions not to pursue death after a guilty 
finding, nullifications by juries and sentencing decisions that remain 
essentially standardless121—could not be expected to produce consistent 
outcomes.122 Indeed, from 1977 to 1999, Georgia sentenced only 243 
persons to death out of 10,912 persons arrested for murder, for a death-
sentence-to-murder rate of 2.2 per hundred.123 Given that almost all 
murders in Georgia were death-eligible offenses,124 one could not 
plausibly claim that narrowing had produced anything approaching 
equality according to deserts in the use of the death penalty.125 
The Court also cannot remedy the inconsistency problem, except 
through abolition or near abolition. We have already seen that even 
extreme narrowing will not produce true consistency in the use of the 
death sanction.126 However, without effectively shutting down death-
penalty systems, the Court also cannot demand even “reasonable” 
consistency. A central problem is that even the worst homicides appear 
to fall into an expansive array of various kinds of murder that cannot find 
definition in narrow terms.127 Many states have resisted narrow 
definitions of death eligibility precisely because restrictive definitions 
 
trial” after a conviction. BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110, at 106. See also JOHN J. DONOHUE III, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973-2007: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION FROM 4686 
MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 2 (2011), available at http://works.bepresscom/john_donohue/87 
(“At best, the Connecticut system haphazardly singles out a handful for execution from a substantial 
array of horrible murders.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1982) (conceding that “the finding of an 
aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its 
discretion, apart from its [purported] function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder 
who are eligible for the death penalty”). 
 122. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 288 (noting many arbitrary factors that influence the 
capital-selection process). 
 123. See John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s 
Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 172 (2004). 
 124. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110, at 268 n.31 (noting that approximately eighty-six 
percent of people convicted of murder in a five-year period after the passage of the post-Furman 
statute were death eligible). 
 125. If eighty-six percent of the 10,912 murders were death-eligible crimes, the death-sentence 
to death-eligibility rate in Georgia for the period would have been one death sentence for every 38.6 
death-eligible murders. 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 90–95. 
 127. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (“To identify before the fact those 
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to 
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the 
sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.”). 
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fail to include many of the most culpable offenders.128 For this same 
reason, the Court cannot identify a robust but specific category of death-
worthy cases in which the offenders are so culpable that arbitrary factors, 
such as the race of the victim or of the defendant, the quality of defense 
counsel, or the influence of political or financial pressures on the 
prosecutor, would not matter.129 
The Court also cannot plausibly pursue consistency by simply 
directing states to achieve a certain proportion between death-eligible 
offenders and death sentences. We can theorize that the Court could, for 
example, order states to narrow to a degree that one of every five or ten 
death-eligible offenders receives a death sanction, rather than one of 
approximately every forty, which represents the post-Furman situation in 
Georgia.130 However, the Court would not know what proportion to 
mandate in a particular state to achieve “reasonable” consistency, as 
measured, for example, by near-zero-racial-disparity levels. The correct 
proportion seemingly would vary over time and across jurisdictions.131 
Also, the Court would have no good basis to know whether the 
proportion chosen in a particular state was working until many persons 
already had received death sentences. The litigation that would arise in 
any effort to confront these problems would largely shut down the use of 
the death penalty.132 Thus, attempting to force states to narrow is not an 
effective regulatory strategy for the Court to try to promote equality in 
the use of the death penalty. 
IV. HOW PROPORTIONALITY DOCTRINE HAS SUPERSEDED 
THE NARROWING MANDATE 
The narrowing requirement is also obsolete in light of modern 
rulings by the Court that prohibit the use of the death penalty for certain 
categories of offenders. Beginning in 1977 and continuing with a series 
 
 128. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 416 (noting a serious concern that forced 
narrowing would require states to exclude from their definitions of death eligibility many of the 
worst offenders). 
 129. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1431 (1988) (“The one thing upon which death penalty 
deregulators and death penalty abolitionists agree is that ‘the task of selecting in some objective way 
those persons who should be condemned to die is one that remains beyond the capacities of the 
criminal justice system.’”) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring)). 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 121–123. 
 131. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2131. 
 132. See id. at 2130–31. 
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of important decisions since 2002, the Justices have foreclosed the use of 
the death penalty for, among others: rapists of adult victims, kidnappers, 
certain felony murderers, retarded offenders, juvenile offenders, and 
child rapists.133 These “proportionality” decisions have helped to reduce 
racial discrimination in the use of the sanction and in that sense, to 
promote consistency.134 However, the decisions do not purport to 
prevent inconsistent use of the death penalty but rather, only undeserved, 
or disproportionate, death sentences.135 By demonstrating a plausible 
Eighth Amendment purpose for the Court to narrow the death-eligible 
class, proportionality doctrine underscores the lack of a feasible function 
for the narrowing rule. 
The groundbreaking proportionality decision after Furman was 
Coker v. Georgia,136 in which the Court banned the death penalty for the 
rape of an adult victim. Writing for a four-Justice plurality,137 Justice 
White sought to demonstrate that society generally had come to oppose 
the death penalty for all rapes.138 He contended, in any event, that the 
question whether capital punishment was excessive was ultimately for 
the Court’s “own judgment.”139 The retributive basis for the plurality’s 
judgment was clear. Justice White did not deny that the execution of 
rapists as much as the execution of murderers could serve general 
deterrence goals. He also did not deny that there were incapacitation 
benefits from executing an unusually dangerous offender like Coker, 
who had raped the victim while on escape from prison, where he was 
serving multiple life sentences for earlier crimes of brutality.140 Instead, 
Justice White argued that rape, while awful, was not among the category 
 
 133. See infra text accompanying notes 134–154. 
 134. See infra notes 155–159 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment: 
How the Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 
423, 453–56 (2009); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 677, 721–25 (2005). 
 136. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 137. Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with the judgment on broader grounds, concluding 
that the death penalty was altogether unconstitutional. See id. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
 138. For the view that the argument was unpersuasive, see Scott W. Howe, Resolving the 
Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 
323, 346 n.89 (1992). 
 139. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion). 
 140. Previously, Coker had raped and murdered one woman and, in a separate incident, had 
raped and tried to kill another. See id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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of horrible crimes for which the death penalty was deserved.141 Thus, the 
opinion embraced a deserts limitation on the death penalty that insists 
that utilitarian arguments for executions, such as deterrence and 
incapacitation, yield to retributive limits. 
For twenty-five years after Coker, the Court made only modest use 
of the proportionality mandate to announce additional categorical 
restrictions on the death penalty. Coker strongly implied that most 
ordinary nonhomicide crimes, such as robbery or burglary, were not 
punishable with death, and the Court also promptly excluded kidnapping, 
where no life was taken.142 In Enmund v. Florida,143 the Court also 
exempted certain minor participants in murders from death eligibility.144 
Although for a unique sort of excessiveness, the Court also held, in Ford 
v. Wainwright,145 that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a 
prisoner who is insane. Likewise, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,146 the 
Court rejected the death penalty for a fifteen-year-old murderer and 
raised serious doubts that it would allow any future executions of persons 
who committed a capital crime before age sixteen.147 At the same time, 
the Court initially rejected claims that offenders who were retarded or 
under age eighteen at the time of their offenses were immune from the 
 
 141. See id. at 598 (plurality opinion) (“Rape is without doubt deserving of serious 
punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does 
not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”). 
 142. See Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977), rev’g Eberheart v. State, 206 S.E.2d 12 
(Ga. 1974) (holding that a statute imposing the death penalty for kidnapping did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment). 
 143. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 144. The Court later limited the exemption that Enmund had drawn. In Enmund, the Court had 
exempted the accomplice in a felony murder who did not himself kill or intend to kill. See id. at 798. 
In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987), the Court ruled that “major participation in the felony 
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life” was enough for the death penalty to 
apply. 
 145. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 146. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 147. Id. at 838. Justice O’Connor provided the fifth vote, and her separate opinion was not 
definitive regarding the underlying principle. The objective evidence of a societal consensus was less 
impressive than the objective evidence of a societal consensus in Coker and Enmund, because many 
states did not set a minimum age on the use of the death penalty although they also had not for many 
years imposed a death sentence for an offense committed by a person below age sixteen. See id. at 
852–53 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Consequently, Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment only 
on grounds that persons who were below the age of sixteen at the time of their offenses could not be 
executed “under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at 
which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender’s execution.” Id. at 857–58. 
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capital sanction,148 and the Court did not further extend the 
proportionality doctrine for the rest of the century. 
Beginning in 2002, however, the Court dramatically expanded the 
proportionality exemptions. First, in Atkins v. Virginia, mentally retarded 
offenders gained protection.149 Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, 
the Court excluded juvenile offenders.150 Likewise, in 2008, in Kennedy 
v. Louisiana, the Court exempted offenders convicted of child rape.151 In 
these decisions, as in Coker, a deserts limitation explained the outcomes. 
The Court found that retarded offenders, juvenile offenders, and child 
rapists are insufficiently culpable to warrant the death penalty.152 The 
Court also claimed—although not always convincingly—to find 
objective evidence that a societal consensus had arisen against the death 
penalty for these offenders.153 Likewise, regarding retarded and juvenile 
offenders, the Court muddled its analysis by asserting that capital 
punishment was less effective in serving deterrence goals.154 But, in 
Kennedy, the Court conceded that the death penalty for child rapists 
might help deter them, and it still found the death penalty excessive.155 
Likewise, in Atkins and Simmons, as Professor Pamela Wilkins has 
 
 148. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding the death penalty for 
seventeen- and sixteen-year-old murderers); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (upholding 
the death penalty for retarded offenders). 
 149. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 150. 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 151. 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008). 
 152. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 153. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438–40. For an argument that changes after 1989 in societal 
views about the death penalty generally, not changes embodied in the Court’s “evolving standards” 
analysis, largely account for the Court’s willingness to expand proportionality protections beginning 
in 2002, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 35–57 (2007). 
 154. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20. The Court’s discussions 
in Atkins and Simmons regarding the reduced deterrent effect of the death penalty were unfortunate. 
Whether or not the imposition of the death penalty on retarded and juvenile murderers would help 
deter other retarded and juvenile persons from crime, a legislature could still conclude that such 
punishment could help deter those who are not retarded or juveniles. Professor H.L.A. Hart pointed 
out long ago that, as a theoretical matter, the fact that an offender suffers from a condition that 
makes him undeterrable does not mean that there is no deterrent effect in punishing him. H.L.A. 
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 19–20, 43 (1968). Indeed, the central explanation for 
proportionality doctrine begins with the acknowledgment that imposing the death penalty on persons 
who do not deserve it can serve utilitarian ends. Thus, rather than deny the likelihood of deterrence, 
the Court would have done better in Atkins and Simmons to clarify that the Eighth Amendment aims 
to prevent the use of the death penalty when the offender does not deserve it, although there may be 
utilitarian advantages in executing him. 
 155. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441 (“[I]t cannot be said with any certainty that the death penalty 
for child rape serves no deterrent . . . function.”). 
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noted, “it seems clear that the Court’s independent conclusion . . . rested 
principally upon the deserts determination.”156 The overall effect of 
these recent decisions, combined with Coker and its earlier progeny, is to 
narrow the possible application of the death penalty away from the most 
marginal categories of cases in terms of offender deserts. 
While the explanation for the proportionality decisions is avoidance 
of retributive excess, the targeted exclusions also have promoted 
consistency by reducing racial disparities in the use of the death sanction. 
Coker surely had the most dramatic effect. Among the 455 men whom 
states executed for rape from 1930 to 1972, 405, or 89%, were African-
American, and almost every victim was white.157 “Rape had always been 
the crime for which the race of the defendant made the biggest 
difference, so Coker instantly wiped away more discrimination than any 
reform of murder sentencing could have.”158 The prohibition on juvenile 
executions may also have helped. In the post-Furman era, twelve of the 
twenty juvenile murderers who faced execution were African-American 
or Latino, and, in seventeen of those cases, the victim or victims were 
white.159 Likewise, in Kennedy, the Court conceded “no confidence” that 
use of the death penalty to punish child rape could avoid the problem of 
arbitrariness—a concern primarily about race discrimination160—that 
confronted the Justices in Furman.161 
The proportionality decisions have overtaken the narrowing rule so 
as to highlight its superfluity. Imagine, for example, that after Furman 
Georgia had enacted a new death-penalty statute that narrowed death 
eligibility in the way that the Court’s proportionality decisions have now 
narrowed the permissible scope of the death penalty. The statute would 
have defined a capital offense to include only murder, excluding several 
nonhomicide offenses, such as rape, that the Georgia statute covered at 
the time of Furman.162 Likewise, the statute would have required after 
 
 156. Wilkins, supra note 135, at 456. 
 157. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in 
DEATH PENALTY STORIES 171, 193 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009). 
 158. BANNER, supra note 5, at 289. 
 159. See VICTOR STREIB, NO. 77, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES 
AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973–FEBRUARY 28, 2005, at 4 (2005), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/juvdeathstreib.pdf. 
 160. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 439. 
 161. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 162. See e.g., Act of April 11, 1968, No. 1157, Sec. 1, §§ 26-401(e), 26-2001, 26-3102, 1968 
Ga. Laws 1249, 1264, 1299, 1335 (repealed and renumbered 1981). The system would also have 
provided a process to protect from execution those inmates who are insane on a proposed date of 
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conviction that the jury find not a single aggravating factor but all three 
of the following: (1) that the offender was not retarded; (2) that the 
offender was not under age eighteen at the time of the offense; and (3) 
that, if the offender did not actually kill or intend to kill, and was, thus, 
only guilty as an accomplice to a felony murder, she exhibited “major 
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless 
indifference to human life.”163 In addition, the statute would have 
allowed the jury, assuming it found all three factors present, to weigh all 
of the additional evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
reaching a sentencing decision.164 Such a system would have met the 
two Eighth Amendment requirements for a constitutional death-
sentencing scheme.165 The system would have narrowed the death-
eligible group, and it would have allowed for the consideration of 
relevant mitigating evidence. Would it have become unconstitutional 
because it would today accomplish no more narrowing than the Court 
has directly accomplished through its various proportionality cases? The 
Court has never pursued the proposition that the narrowing rule requires 
a particular kind or amount of narrowing.166 Yet, if no additional 
narrowing is required, the narrowing rule today commands nothing more 
than proportionality doctrine requires. 
The robust development of proportionality doctrine underscores why 
the Court should concede that the narrowing rule is superfluous. 
Proportionality doctrine demonstrates that the Court can provide specific 
direction about the narrowing that states must accomplish to serve a 
plausible Eighth Amendment end. By contrast, the narrowing rule has 
gone largely undeveloped, because it lacks a plausible Eighth 
Amendment function. Proportionality doctrine both reveals the actual 
rationale for limited narrowing by the Court and highlights the vacuous 
nature of the separate call for states, without specific direction, to 
narrow. 
 
execution. See supra text accompanying note 145. 
 163. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); see also supra note 142 and accompanying 
text (discussing the exclusion for certain accomplices on the fringes of the felony-murder rule). 
 164. I assume that the system would also have included a requirement that the Georgia 
Supreme Court conduct an appellate review to ensure that a death sentence did not appear excessive 
in relation to sentences imposed in similar cases. The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
154 (1976) (plurality opinion), noted that the new Georgia statute included such a mandate. See id. at 
198. At the same time, the Supreme Court has clarified that this kind of appellate review is not 
necessarily required by the Eighth Amendment. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1984). 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2. 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 97–123. 
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V. THE BENEFITS OF REPUDIATING THE NARROWING 
MANDATE 
While the narrowing mandate has not amounted to much in practice 
and lacks a plausible Eighth Amendment explanation, one might still 
question why the Court should openly repudiate it at this late date. After 
all, the Court has not done much since 1976 to develop and enforce the 
requirement and has also effectively retreated from the small steps 
forward that it took in Godfrey and Cartwright.167 If the Court already 
has essentially abandoned the narrowing mandate, except in rhetoric, 
why now repudiate it? The answer is that candor from the Court could 
help reduce continuing confusion over the goal of the second mandate in 
capital-sentencing doctrine and promote intelligent discourse about how 
best to pursue that goal. Likewise, candor could clarify that the Court 
does not believe that capital-sentencing doctrine has assured reasonable 
consistency in the use of the death penalty. Repudiation of the narrowing 
rule would help the Court acknowledge that the Eighth Amendment goal 
that it has pursued in regulating capital-sentencing trials is not equality 
but the avoidance of undeserved death sentences. 
A. Developing a Rationale for Regulating Capital-Sentencing Trials 
The idea that the narrowing rule aims to achieve consistency has 
long given rise to confusion over how the Court could endorse the 
second mandate: individualized sentencing based on expansive 
consideration of mitigating evidence and the exercise of discretion.168 If 
the first mandate aims to pursue equality, the second seems to honor 
something opposite—that every capital offender is unique or nearly so 
when it comes to assessing his proper punishment.169 Some Justices have 
cited this purported conflict as a reason to abandon the death penalty, and 
others have cited it as a reason to confine or even abandon the second 
mandate.170 Of course, these arguments ignore not only that narrowing 
and individualized sentencing are actually compatible as doctrines,171 
 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 66–73. 
 168. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital 
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1001 (1996) (“Commentators have often remarked that 
Furman’s mandate of consistency and Woodson’s mandate of individualization compete with one 
another at some level.”). 
 169. See CARTER, KREITZBERG & HOWE, supra note 118, at 169. 
 170. See infra text accompanying notes 178–179. 
 171. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text. 
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but also that the Court has never developed the narrowing rule, nor has 
the rule itself ever produced consistency. Nonetheless, the Court’s 
continued use of consistency rhetoric in explaining the narrowing rule 
has fueled the ongoing confusion and impeded the development by the 
Court of a plausible Eighth Amendment theory to explain the second 
mandate.172 Explicit repudiation of the narrowing rule would help the 
Court to acknowledge that the Eighth Amendment regulation of capital-
sentencing trials should center on the principle behind the second 
mandate. 
1. The rhetorical conflict of the two mandates 
Within the Court, the idea that the Eighth Amendment doctrine 
embodies a problematic tension between the two mandates has come 
largely from the conservatives, whose goal is not to promote consistency 
but to cabin or eviscerate the second mandate.173 The second mandate 
first arose from the two 1976 decisions in which the Court struck down 
mandatory death systems in North Carolina and Louisiana.174 A decisive 
plurality—Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens—concluded that the 
mandatory schemes precluded the sentencer from considering “the 
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the 
diverse frailties of humankind.”175 Dissenters claimed that these 
decisions were at odds with Furman and the pursuit of consistency that 
the same plurality had endorsed in upholding three other statutes in 
1976.176 Nonetheless, the Court reiterated and even expanded the 
individualized-sentencing requirement two years later in Lockett v. Ohio, 
 
 172. See Howe, supra note 12, at 438–40. 
 173. If conservatives, in pointing to the conflict, actually sought to achieve consistency in the 
distribution of death sentences, they would have to view all existing death penalty statutes as 
unconstitutional. All existing statutes provide the individualized consideration required by the 
second mandate and thus, could not provide consistency, according to the argument. Conservative 
Justices have not endorsed the view that all existing death penalty statutes are unconstitutional. See 
Scott W. Howe, Furman’s Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 435, 459–60 (2007). 
 174. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). 
 175. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion). See also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333–34 
(“Even the other more narrowly drawn categories of first-degree murder in the Louisiana law afford 
no meaningful opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors presented by the circumstances of 
the particular crime or by the attributes of the individual offender.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Roberts, 428 U.S. at 346 (White, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are now in no position 
to rule that [Louisiana’s] present law, having eliminated the overt discretionary power of juries, 
suffers from the same constitutional infirmities which led this Court to invalidate the Georgia death 
penalty statute in Furman.”). 
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when it rejected an Ohio “special-question” system as too mandatory.177 
The Lockett Court ruled that the capital sentencer must remain free to 
reject the death penalty based on “any aspect of a defendant’s character 
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”178 Conservative 
Justices have continued to allege a problematic tension with the goal of 
consistency as a reason to confine or even abolish this expansive 
individualization rule.179 Justices Scalia and Thomas also have asserted 
that the individualization rule lacks an Eighth Amendment 
explanation,180 and, indeed, the Lockett opinion did not provide a well-
developed rationale for it. The Court has continued generally to enforce 
the Lockett holding,181 but that mandate also continues to face criticism 
 
 177. See 438 U.S. 586, 607 (1978) (plurality opinion). The Ohio statute required a death 
sentence unless the offender could establish by a preponderance of the evidence one of three 
mitigating circumstances: 
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it. 
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the 
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation. 
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or mental 
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. 
Id. at 612–13 (appendix to opinion of the Court) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 
1975)).  
 178. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion). 
 179. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 49 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing his 
argument in Walton); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 293–94 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(repeating essence of his argument in Walton); id. at 294–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
petitioner’s claim on grounds that contradiction in the doctrine justified restricting the 
individualized-consideration mandate); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373 (1993) (“Our capital 
sentencing jurisprudence seeks to reconcile two competing, and valid, principles in Furman, which 
are to allow mitigating evidence to be considered and to guide the discretion of the sentencer.”); id. 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (repeating essence of his argument in Walton); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 
639, 666–67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (contending that the 
individualization mandate undermines “consistency and rationality among sentencing 
determinations” because it “permits sentencers to accord different treatment, for whatever mitigating 
reasons they wish, not only to two different murderers but to two murderers whose crimes have been 
found to be of similar gravity”); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (asserting need to balance competing goals of realizing nondiscriminatory results and 
allowing for individualized consideration); Locket, 438 U.S. at 622 (White, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgments of the Court) (asserting that “[t]he Court has now 
completed its about-face since Furman”); id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (contending that the Lockett rule “will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the 
imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it”). 
 180. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 486–88 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 181. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439–44 (1990) (rejecting requirement 
that jury find mitigating circumstances unanimously); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) 
2.HOWE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:57 PM 
1477 The Narrowing Rule in Capital Sentencing 
 1505 
from conservatives based on the purported conflict with the goal of 
consistency.182 
The conflict exists only in the Court’s rhetoric about the purposes of 
the doctrine rather than in the doctrine itself. However, the rhetoric 
hinders understanding and assessment of capital-sentencing doctrine. At 
the doctrinal level, narrowing of the death-eligible group does not 
conflict with individualized sentencing.183 States can narrow the death-
eligible group, while also providing the individualized sentencing 
required by Lockett.184 Yet, the rhetorical claims about the first mandate 
impede the explanation of the second one. The Court has continued to 
claim to enforce the narrowing rule and that the rationale is the pursuit of 
equality. Until the Court stops making those claims, it cannot sensibly 
articulate a rationale for the second mandate that rejects equality as an 
Eighth Amendment end. 
 
(concluding that Texas statute did not allow jury an adequate opportunity to reject death penalty 
based on mitigating evidence of retardation and childhood abuse); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 
393, 397–99 (1987) (rejecting requirement that mitigating factors appear on statutory list in order to 
be considered in sentencing); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67, 85 (1987) (rejecting mandatory 
death penalty for intentional murder by an inmate already serving life sentence without possibility of 
parole); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5–6, 8 (1986) (reversing death sentence where 
sentencing judge had refused to consider evidence of defendant’s good behavior while in jail 
awaiting trial); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112–13 (1982) (overturning death sentence 
imposed based on statute interpreted by state courts to preclude consideration of defendant’s 
emotional disturbance and violent and tumultuous childhood); (Harry) Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U.S. 633, 637–38 (1977) (per curiam) (striking down mandatory death penalty for murder of police 
officer). But see Graham, 506 U.S. at 463, 478 (rejecting, on nonretroactivity grounds, claim that 
youth, family background and positive character traits could not be adequately considered under 
Texas statute). 
 182. Justices seeking to limit or undermine the second mandate are not the only ones to cite 
the conflict as a reason for reform. Justice Blackmun originally rejected the second mandate, see, 
e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 363 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), then came to accept 
it, see California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 562–63 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and then later 
concluded that it fundamentally conflicted with the first mandate, see Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 
1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari). However, he concluded that 
the solution was to strike down all existing death penalty statutes, see id. at 1158–59, and he asserted 
doubt that any statute could appropriately reconcile the purported conflict. See id. at 1145. 
 183. See, e.g., Walton, 497 U.S. at 716–18 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that there is 
no tension at the doctrinal level, because the narrowing function for identifying statutory aggravators 
functions at an eligibility phase while the individualized-consideration mandate functions at a 
subsequent selection phase where the sentencer actually decides whether the offender should receive 
the death penalty). 
 184. See CARTER, KREITZBERG & HOWE, supra note 118, at 170–71. 
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2. Eliminating the first mandate to focus on the second 
Repudiating the narrowing rule would clarify that the 
individualization mandate is the core of capital-sentencing doctrine and 
would eliminate a major obstacle to rationalizing and assessing that 
mandate.185 If the narrowing rule disappears, the perceived need to 
justify it on consistency grounds also disappears, which allows an 
explanation for individualization that permits inconsistency. Thus, by 
repudiating the narrowing rule, the Court would decisively end the 
confusion over whether capital-sentencing regulation is at war with itself 
and could proceed to address important questions about the purpose and 
legitimacy of the second mandate. 
The second mandate finds Eighth Amendment explanation in the 
same theory that explains proportionality doctrine.186 The goal is to help 
ensure that no one receives a death sentence who does not deserve it. 
Even after the exclusion of those offenders who are protected from death 
eligibility by proportionality doctrine, the deserts of those who have 
committed capital crimes vary greatly. Laws concerning felony murder 
and vicarious liability bring within the death-eligible group many capital 
offenders whose involvement in the capital crime is low. The mental 
states, mental capacities, and prior conduct of those who are highly 
involved in a capital crime also can differ enormously. Whether or not all 
capital offenders are unique, they vary widely in their deserts, and 
legislatures arguably cannot adequately capture the important variances 
with categorical sentencing rules. Both permitting the convicted capital 
offender, at a separate sentencing hearing, to present any mitigating 
evidence that he desires concerning his character, record, or crime, and 
ensuring that the sentencer can use that evidence to reject the death 
penalty could help to avoid undeserved death sentences.187 
 
 185. Some Justices have at times asserted that both mandates serve the pursuit of equality. See, 
e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976) (plurality opinion) (asserting that the 
failure to individualize capital sentencing would treat all capital offenders alike when differences 
exist among them). However, the claim that individualized sentencing promotes consistency in the 
use of the death penalty is implausible if only because individualized sentencing provides no 
safeguard against arbitrary reprieves outside of the sentencing trial. 
 186. See Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing: 
Darrow’s Defense of Leopold & Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1051–56 (1994). 
 187. The deserts limitation, much more than a consistency goal, also can explain why the 
Court has focused its Eighth Amendment regulatory efforts on the capital-sentencing trial. A 
consistency theory cannot plausibly explain why the Court would regulate the capital-sentencing 
trial while leaving prosecutors with almost unfettered discretion to not pursue death sentences in 
death-eligible cases. Mandating equality at the sentencing trial is senseless unless it is part of an 
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Accepting the deserts limitation as the central Eighth Amendment 
principle governing capital selection188 would not eliminate 
disagreements over how the Court should regulate the capital-sentencing 
trial. Indeed, Justices who concur on the centrality of the deserts 
limitation could still differ over how to pursue it.189 Because the Court 
lacks the ability to translate the command into specific rules about who 
actually deserves death, some Justices could favor deregulation of the 
capital-sentencing trial and reliance simply on the proportionality rules to 
define a death-eligible group.190 Justices who are skeptical of the Court’s 
ability to protect against improper influences (such as racial bias) on 
capital sentencers could favor abolition or near abolition.191 Justices who 
reject both deregulation and abolition could conclude that proportionality 
doctrine and the individualized-sentencing rule most effectively fulfill 
the deserts limitation, which means that they would not vote to expand 
regulation of the sentencing trial but could support further expansion of 
proportionality protections.192 Finally, some Justices could favor 
 
effort to achieve equality in the greater selection process, which could only be pursued, even in 
theory, by trying to regulate prosecutorial decisions on charging and plea-bargaining in capital cases. 
In contrast, the deserts limitation does not assert that everyone who deserves a death penalty must 
receive it, but only that those who do not deserve the sanction should not receive it. Regulating the 
sentencing trial might help to protect against undeserved death sentences even if prosecutors are 
allowed to act arbitrarily in deciding which death-eligible offenders to pursue. 
 188. The deserts limitation rests on the notion that the Eighth Amendment proscribes 
disproportional punishments in addition to punishments deemed inherently inhumane. Some Justices 
have concluded, on originalist grounds, that the prohibition is only against certain inhumane forms 
of punishment. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to place only 
substantive limitations on punishments . . . .”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[T]he Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing 
particular forms or ‘modes’ of punishment . . . .”). However, the “modes only” position is vigorously 
disputed on historical grounds, and since Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), a 
majority of the Court has consistently rejected it. See Howe, supra note 173, at 461–62. See also 
Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY. BILL RTS. J. 475, 507–19 
(2005) (contending that an originalist inquiry demonstrates “that the ban was meant to outlaw 
punishments that, while permissible in some circumstances, are disproportionate for the offense and 
the offender at hand”). 
 189. See Howe, supra note 173, at 464–80. 
 190. See Howe, supra note 10, at 835–43 (explaining the argument for deregulation of the 
capital-sentencing trial and reliance on proportionality rules regarding death-eligibility); see also 
Howe, supra note 186, at 1056–68 (describing the grounds for unease over the Court’s imposition of 
the individualization mandate). 
 191. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2085–89 (explaining the Eighth Amendment argument for 
abolition based on disproportionality stemming from unconscious racial discrimination). 
 192. See Howe, supra note 173, at 474–76 (explaining current doctrine as a compromise 
between arguments for deregulation and abolition). 
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additional regulation of sentencing trials to try to ensure that capital 
sentencers impose the death penalty only on those who deserve it.193 
Repudiation of the narrowing rule would not end debate about capital-
sentencing regulation. However, repudiation would help focus the debate 
on how to implement the core restriction that the Constitution imposes 
on the distribution of capital sentences. 
B. Honesty About Inequality 
Repudiation of the narrowing rule would also help the Court 
acknowledge that capital selection is arbitrary and undesirably 
discriminatory. The many claims by Justices that the narrowing rule has 
assured reasonable consistency in the use of the death penalty have 
conveyed that a majority of the Court does not perceive substantial 
inequality in capital selection.194 If the Court were to concede that the 
Eighth Amendment does not require equality, the Justices would not 
need to obscure the truth. 
1. The racial discrimination problem and the inability of the Court to 
plausibly discount it under a consistency view of the Eighth Amendment 
The problem of racial discrimination, whether intentional or 
unconscious, has continued to plague capital selection in the modern 
 
 193. See, e.g., Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital 
Cases, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2590, 2599 (1996) (asserting that states should “instruct sentencers that the 
death penalty . . . is reserved only for those defendants who deserve the penalty and that the moral 
judgment of whether death is deserved remains entirely with them; that the determination whether 
death is deserved involves consideration of any factor that suggests whether the defendant is or is not 
among the small group of ‘worst’ offenders; and that, in deciding whether the defendant deserves the 
death penalty, the sentencer is required to consider not only the circumstances surrounding the crime 
but also aspects of the defendant’s character, background, and capabilities that bear on his 
culpability for the crime”); Howe, supra note 173, at 478 (contending that prosecutors should not be 
allowed to “present capital sentencers with utilitarian evidence or arguments to justify death 
sentences”). 
 194. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 338–39 (1997) (asserting 
that the McCleskey majority “did not want to concede facts” indicating the powerful influence of 
race in Georgia’s post-Furman-death-penalty system and that “[d]oing so would have performed the 
tremendous benefit of educating the public about the real world of capital sentencing and the real 
world of Supreme Court decisionmaking”); Robert A. Burt, Wrong Tomorrow, Wrong Yesterday, but 
Not Today: On Sliding into Evil with Zeal but Without Understanding, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 19, 34–35 (1999) (citing McCleskey as the first example for the proposition that “Dred Scott, of 
course, is by general agreement today ranked as the low point, the most deeply immoral ruling, in 
our constitutional jurisprudence (though I must say that the decision has earned this rank only after a 
close race in a crowded field)”); Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1389 (asserting that the decision in 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) “repressed the truth”). 
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era.195 The problem surely is not as severe as in the pre-Furman past.196 
American society generally has progressed since the 1960s in reducing 
racial prejudice for many reasons that go beyond the Court’s doctrine.197 
Likewise, the Court has developed laws, other than the narrowing rule, 
that marginally limit racial bias in the capital selection process, even if 
obliquely. One example, as we have seen, is the proportionality doctrine, 
particularly the elimination of rape as a death-eligible crime.198 The 
Court also has taken steps to ensure greater participation on juries by 
members of racial minority groups199 and to allow the ferreting out of 
racial bias during jury selection in capital cases.200 Nonetheless, there 
can be no doubt, as Justice O’Connor asserted not long ago, that, in the 
United States, “race unfortunately still matters.”201 In the post-Furman 
era, empirical evidence concerning capital selection bears out this 
conclusion. There are many studies from a variety of jurisdictions 
demonstrating that the race of the victim and, to a lesser extent, the race 
of the defendant, often continue to influence decisions determining 
which capital offenders receive the death penalty.202 
The most sophisticated investigation of race and capital selection, the 
famous Baldus study,203 gave rise to what is surely the Court’s most 
controversial decision on capital selection after Furman. Based on a 
painstaking study of Georgia murder cases from the mid- to late 1970s, 
the Baldus researchers concluded that a defendant faced odds 4.3 times 
 
 195. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 132–34 (1999); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Courtroom Contortions: How 
America’s Application of the Death Penalty Erodes the Principle of Equal Justice Under Law, THE 
AM. PROSPECT, July 2004, at A19–21 (“The Court’s reason for [the result in McCleskey v. Kemp] 
came close to a frank admission that the administration of capital punishment would grind to a halt if 
courts took seriously the challenge of ensuring that death sentences are not the products of racial 
bias.”). 
 196. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 5, at 289 (noting the importance of the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s in increasing greater representation of blacks on juries). 
 197. See, e.g., BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 236 (2006) (“I maintain, however, that in today’s America [racial] prejudices are 
far more loosely held than they once were—and hence are subject to refutation.”). 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 155–156. 
 199. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (restricting the ability of 
prosecutors to use peremptory strikes to eliminate potential jurors). 
 200. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 28–33 (1986) (ruling that a capital defendant charged 
with an interracial crime can advise prospective jurors of the race of the victim and inquire about 
their possible racial bias). 
 201. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
 202. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2106–23. 
 203. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110. 
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higher of receiving the death penalty solely because his victim was white 
rather than black.204 Regarding race-of-defendant discrimination, the 
researchers found that black defendants enjoyed an advantage over white 
defendants in the overall run of cases.205 Black murderers, as a group, 
were beneficiaries because their crimes were usually intra-racial.206 
Nonetheless, among the white-victim cases, the researchers concluded 
that a defendant faced odds 2.4 times higher of receiving the death 
penalty simply because he was black rather than white.207 Thus, solely 
because of racial factors, a black offender who killed a white person 
faced odds many times higher of receiving the death penalty than a white 
offender who killed a black person. This evidence formed the basis for 
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment 
brought by Warren McCleskey, a black man who had been sentenced to 
death in Georgia during the relevant period for killing a white police 
officer. Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected those challenges by a 
five-to-four vote in McCleskey v. Kemp.208 
While critics reviled the McCleskey decision on multiple grounds,209 
the most objectionable part of the majority opinion concerned the 
rejection of the Eighth Amendment challenge. The Court purported to 
assume that the Baldus study was valid because the Court of Appeals had 
assumed its validity.210 Despite that assumption, the Supreme Court at 
least offered an intelligible basis to reject McCleskey’s Equal Protection 
claim. The majority asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment required 
proof “that the decision-makers in his case acted with discriminatory 
purpose,” and that the statistical study failed to establish that any of the 
 
 204. See id. at 316. 
 205. See id. at 327. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. at 328. 
 208. 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987). The majority Justices were Powell, Rehnquist, White, 
O’Connor, and Scalia. See id. at 282. The dissenters were Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and 
Stevens. See id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 209. See, e.g., The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 158 (1987) 
(describing the decision as “logically unsound, morally reprehensible, and legally unsupportable”). 
 210. While the Federal District court had found the Baldus study flawed, the Court of Appeals 
had assumed that the study was valid and had, nonetheless, rejected the constitutional claims. See 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987). There was support in the amicus filings in the 
Supreme Court for the methodological soundness of the study. A group of eminent social scientists 
endorsed its validity. See Brief for Dr. Franlin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard O. Lempert, Dr. Peter W. 
Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel & Professor Franklin E. Zimring as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner Warren McCleskey at 3, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 
(No. 84-6811). 
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relevant decision-makers in McCleskey’s case acted with such a 
purpose.211 While one might disagree with that interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court’s precedents supported it,212 and it 
provided a clear explanation of why McCleskey’s evidence, even if 
accepted, was insufficient. As for the Eighth Amendment claim, 
however, the Court obfuscated. If the Baldus study was valid, it showed 
dramatic inconsistency in the distribution of death sentences based on 
race—particularly the race of the victim—and the Court had never 
suggested that “invidious intent” mattered under the Eighth 
Amendment.213 Confronted with this claim, the Court equivocated both 
about the meaning of the study and about whether the Eighth 
Amendment required reasonable consistency.214 At some points, the 
Court implied that the Eighth Amendment required consistency,215 but 
the Baldus study did not show that the Georgia system failed to achieve 
it.216 At other times, the Court implied that, while there might be 
inconsistency in Georgia’s selection process, such inequality was not 
constitutionally relevant, although the Court did not illuminate a 
principled Eighth Amendment reason.217 The Court recounted its 
 
 211. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292. 
 212. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1403 (“Had the court ruled differently in McCleskey it 
would not have been in step with judicial tradition; to the contrary, it would have been making an 
unprecedented step forward.”). 
 213. COLE, supra note 195, at 136. 
 214. See, e.g., id. at 140 (describing why the “reader of McCleskey comes away with 
conflicting messages”). 
 215. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 303 (reiterating the plurality’s claim in Gregg that the 
post-Furman Georgia system safeguarded “against arbitrariness and caprice”); id. at 306–07 
(“[A]bsent a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other 
defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.”); id. at 313 n.37 (“The 
Gregg-type statute imposes unprecedented safeguards in the special context of capital punishment 
[to promote rationality].”). 
 216. See, e.g., id. at 291 n.7 (“Our assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does 
not include the assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually enter into any 
sentencing decisions in Georgia.”); id. at 312 (“At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy 
that appears to correlate with race.”); id. at 313 (“[W]e decline to assume that what is unexplained is 
invidious.”); id. at 308 (“Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered 
into some decisions.”). 
 217. See, e.g., id. at 307 n.28 (asserting that “[t]he Constitution is not offended by 
inconsistency” that results from various discretionary decisions that occur throughout the selection 
process); id. at 311 (“But the inherent lack of predictability of jury decisions does not justify their 
condemnation.”); id. at 317 (“If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the touchstone under the 
Eighth Amendment, such a claim could—at least in theory—be used upon any arbitrary 
variable . . . .”); id. at 319 (“The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any 
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doctrine on capital selection and concluded that, since Georgia had 
complied with it, “we lawfully may presume” that McCleskey’s death 
sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.218 However, the opinion 
both discounted the reality of racial inequality revealed by the Baldus 
study and failed to clarify the purpose of the Eighth Amendment in 
regulating capital selection. 
Despite abundant empirical evidence that race—usually the race of 
the victim—continues to influence outcomes in capital selection, Court 
majorities since McCleskey have also often spoken as if these studies are 
invalid.219 In 1990, after an evaluative synthesis of all fifty-three then-
existing post-Furman studies, the General Accounting Office concluded 
that the race of the victim frequently influenced the selection process.220 
Subsequent studies, while not unanimous, confirm this general 
conclusion.221 The empirical evidence is readily available, and the 
Justices seem likely to have noted it. Nonetheless, as we have seen, 
Court majorities after McCleskey have not simply remained silent about 
the inequality but have often effectively denied it,222 declaring that the 
narrowing rule serves to “ensure consistency in determining who 
receives a death sentence.” 223 
As long as the Court clings to the rhetoric of consistency to explain 
the narrowing rule, it cannot speak candidly about unconscious 
discrimination and caprice in capital selection. Surely, the disconnection 
 
demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a 
criminal justice system that includes capital punishment.”). 
 218. Id. at 308. 
 219. After McCleskey, these studies generally are useless to establish a constitutional 
violation. The exception concerns studies that tend to confirm racialized decisionmaking by a 
particular prosecutor’s office across many cases. Such studies could sometimes help show the kind 
of discrimination required to establish an equal protection violation. See John H. Blume, Theodore 
Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1805–06 (1998). 
 220. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: 
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5–6 (1990) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. 
 221. See Howe, supra note 13, at 2117–19 (discussing several subsequent studies); see also 
Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807 (2009) 
(recent study of race and capital selection in Harris County, Texas, which encompasses Houston); 
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death 
Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 23–28, tbls.6, 7 & 8 
(2006) (recent study of race and geographical disparities in capital selection in California). Cf. 
DONOHUE, supra note 120, at 2–3 (finding arbitrariness in the use of the death penalty in 
Connecticut from 1973 to 2007). 
 222. See supra Part V. 
 223. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008). 
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between rhetoric and reality stems from the Court’s effort to uphold 
capital punishment without contradicting its past efforts to find 
congruence with Furman; the Justices likely understand the reality of 
unconscious discrimination and caprice. Years after McCleskey, in the 
papers of the late Justice Marshall, an internal Court memo from Justice 
Scalia surfaced,224 revealing that he had advised the other Justices, as the 
Court considered McCleskey, that he had no doubt that capital selection 
continued to be influenced by “irrational sympathies and antipathies, 
including racial” ones, and that these influences were ineradicable.225 
Although Justice Scalia did not write the opinion in McCleskey, he joined 
it, and his memo underscores that even those in the majority probably 
understood that the Court’s narrowing rule had done little to promote 
equality. Of course, given the public outcry and the frenzy of new death-
penalty legislation after Furman, many Justices may strongly resist any 
concession that would again seem to call for widespread invalidation of 
death-penalty systems. Yet, the Court obscures a serious social problem 
when it claims that the distinction between pre- and post-Furman death-
penalty systems is “reasonable consistency.” Even if the Court will not 
strike down death-penalty systems that produce unequal outcomes, it 
does not serve us well by masking reality. 
 
 224. See, e.g., Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies 
from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER. L. REV. 
1035, 1037–38 (1994) (discussing the public revelation of the memo when the Library of Congress 
made public the papers of Justice Marshall). 
 225. Henry J. Reske, Behind the Scenes, 79 A.B.A. J., August 1993, at 28 (quoting 
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Antonin Scalia, in No. 84-6811 – McCleskey v. Kemp 
of Jan. 6, 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp File, THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, The Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.) The context of the statement in the memo was as follows: 
Scalia expressed his general support for Justice Lewis Powell’s initial attempts to draft a 
majority opinion. But more significantly, it was also a medium for Scalia’s “two 
reservations . . . .” “I disagree,” he began, “with the argument that the inferences that can 
be drawn from the Baldus study are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is 
unique, or by the large number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit 
in [Powell’s draft opinion], that an effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could be 
shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, would require reversal. Since it is my 
view,” Scalia continued, “that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial [ones] is real, 
acknowledged by the [cases] of this court and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I 
need is more proof.” 
See Dorin, supra note 224, at 1037–38 (alterations in original). 
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2. Addressing the racial discrimination problem more forthrightly under 
a deserts-limitation view of the Eighth Amendment. 
The Court need not obscure the existence of discrimination and 
caprice if it acknowledges that the deserts limitation fully explains its 
Eighth Amendment regulation of capital selection.226 This limitation is 
not offended if many capital offenders who deserve the death penalty 
escape that sanction. The deserts limitation commands only that no one 
receive the death sanction who does not deserve it. Thus, by renouncing 
the narrowing requirement and focusing on the second mandate, the 
Court could not only provide a unified theory of Eighth Amendment 
regulation but could also speak candidly about the problem of “irrational 
sympathies and antipathies, including racial” ones,227 left unsolved. 
Because the deserts limitation does not aim to prevent inconsistency, 
statistical studies finding the influence of irrational factors on capital 
selection in a city, county, or state generally do not establish a 
constitutional violation. First, the studies often do not separately examine 
the capital-sentencing trial or, if so, they do not identify racialized 
decisionmaking at that stage.228 Often, studies look only at the overall 
death-selection process or only at the decisions of prosecutors.229 
Likewise, among the few statistical studies that have attempted to isolate 
racialized decisionmaking at the sentencing phase, some have found no 
evidence that capital sentencers favored white defendants or killers of 
black victims.230 Studies that fail to identify racial effects at the 
sentencing stage do little to prove that death sentences that have been 
issued in a jurisdiction are undeserved. If a sentencing jury has correctly 
determined that a guilty and convicted capital murderer deserves the 
death sanction, his deserts do not change because unconscious racial bias 
motivated the prosecutor to seek that sanction. The motivations of the 
 
 226. Although too ill-developed and distracting to warrant perpetuation, even the narrowing 
requirement is better explained by the deserts limitation than by a consistency mandate. See Howe, 
supra note 10, at 833. 
 227. See Reske, supra note 225 (quoting Memorandum to the Conference from Justice 
Antonin Scalia, in No. 84-6811 – McCleskey v. Kemp of Jan. 6, 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp File, 
THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
 228. See Scott W. Howe, 2010 Death Penalty Issue: Race, Death and Disproportionality, 37 
N. KY. L. REV. 213, 226 & n.86 (2010). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 221, at 830–39 (finding no evidence that capital-sentencing 
juries in Harris County (Houston), Texas, between 1992 and 1999, acted out of bias against black 
defendants or against killers of white victims, despite finding strong evidence that, due to racialized 
decisionmaking by prosecutors, those defendants were disfavored in the overall selection process). 
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prosecutor alone would not undermine the reliability of the jury’s deserts 
determination.231 
Under a deserts limitation, even statistical studies that separately 
examine the capital-sentencing trial and find racial effects at that stage 
carry muted probative value. The problem is that the studies cannot 
distinguish between two kinds of unconscious discrimination—one 
prohibited by the deserts limitation and one permitted. Because the 
deserts limitation is unidirectional, it is forgiving of unconscious racial 
bias in favor of mercy, although it is not indifferent to racial bias that 
influences a desert finding in support of a death sentence. Statistical 
studies indicating racialized decisionmaking at the capital-sentencing 
stage cannot reveal the degree to which the racial effects reflect one kind 
of discrimination versus the other. The ultimate question for the 
interpreter of these studies remains whether sentencers seem to be 
condemning some capital offenders who do not deserve it or merely 
reprieving some others who do deserve it. 
In McCleskey, the evidence from the Baldus study, if accepted as 
valid, unquestionably demonstrated an Eighth Amendment violation 
under a “reasonable consistency” command, but it was much less 
compelling under a deserts limitation. “Much of the disparity seemed 
attributable to Georgia prosecutors, who sought the death penalty in 70 
percent of cases involving black defendants and white victims, but only 
19 percent of cases involving white defendants and black victims.”232 
Yet, evidence of prosecutorial bias was not evidence that Georgia juries 
sentenced defendants to death who did not deserve it. The Baldus study 
also revealed statistical evidence of racialized decisionmaking at Georgia 
sentencing trials.233 Yet, there was no clarity that the statistical evidence 
of bias by juries reflected undeserved death sentences rather than 
undeserved reprieves. Some commentators would be predisposed to 
 
 231. A plausible argument can be made that even a statistical study that indicates racialized 
decisionmaking by prosecutors, but not by sentencing juries, could justify a disproportionality 
conclusion under the Eighth Amendment. The argument would assert that, at some point, the 
expressive function of capital punishment should carry paramount importance and that the 
expressive function is distorted when large racial disparities arise. See Lee, supra note 135, at 712–
13. Under this view, the proportionality notion would carry a limited comparative element, although 
the point at which a finding of disproportionality should arise would remain elusive. I note, however, 
that this argument lacks a solid foundation in the existing capital-sentencing rulings of the Supreme 
Court. 
 232. COLE, supra note 195, at 133, (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 233. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 110, at 187 tbl.44. 
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conclude that the bias was not about mercy.234 Yet, “[m]any observers 
have contended” that the central problem was not undue harshness 
toward any group but a “devaluation of black victims” and, thus, a 
“relative leniency extended to killers of blacks.”235 The facts 
surrounding Warren McCleskey’s offense certainly did not suggest that 
his was a marginal case for the death penalty. Evidence indicated that he 
had participated in an armed robbery of a furniture store during which he 
personally and intentionally had killed a police officer who had 
responded to a silent alarm.236 Evidence also revealed that McCleskey 
had participated in two additional armed robberies in the weeks 
preceding the capital offense.237 At McCleskey’s trial, Georgia also had 
allowed him to present any mitigating evidence as defined by Lockett 
and allowed the jury freedom to reject the death penalty. If the function 
of the Eighth Amendment was to ensure that McCleskey would not 
receive the death penalty unless he deserved it, the Court plausibly could 
disbelieve that the Baldus study demonstrated that his jury had acted 
unfairly. 
Had the McCleskey Court chosen to highlight the evidence of 
inconsistency but relied on the deserts limitation to explain why that 
evidence did not establish an Eighth Amendment violation, the Court 
still would have displeased many, but at least it would have spoken 
forthrightly. That approach would have been better than the course the 
majority followed. The actual McCleskey opinion sought to discount the 
Baldus study as if it had uncovered only a minor anomaly.238 The 
majority asserted at one point, for example, that “[a]t most, the Baldus 
study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race.”239 In 
the same vein, the Court sought to maintain the fiction that the Eighth 
Amendment required consistency in the distribution of death sentences 
and that the doctrine assured it. The Court claimed, for example, that the 
 
 234. One can sensibly conclude that a likelihood that desert determinations that underlie even 
a fraction of death verdicts are distorted by racial prejudice and other improper factors justifies 
striking down a death-penalty system for violating the deserts limitation. See supra text 
accompanying note 190. Nonetheless, much room for disagreement remains over the level of 
imperfection that should be allowed of any system and further, over whether statistical studies can 
ever sufficiently establish that a system is producing any or too many undeserved death sentences. 
See supra text accompanying notes 230–31. 
 235. Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1391, 1393. 
 236. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283. 
 237. See McCleskey v. State, 263 S.E.2d. 146, 150 (Ga. 1980). 
 238. KENNEDY, supra note 194, at 338. 
 239. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312. 
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Georgia system safeguarded “against arbitrariness and caprice.”240 
Nonetheless, in the end, the Court also noted the option of a legislative 
response to the problem. The majority asserted that “McCleskey’s 
arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies.”241 Yet, the Court 
could not effectively emphasize a need for democratic reform while 
simultaneously denying the need for it.242 Reliance on the deserts 
limitation alone would have allowed the Court to highlight rather than 
discount what the Baldus study established and to explain intelligibly 
why the study did not establish an Eighth Amendment violation.243  
The McCleskey Court also could have revised the explanation of 
congruence between Furman and modern doctrine, and that explanation 
is easy.244 The two defendants in the companion cases to Furman, Elmer 
Branch and Lucious Jackson, had received the death penalty for rape.245 
According to the Coker decision, which came only five years after 
Furman and invalidated the death penalty for rape, those death sentences 
 
 240. Id. at 303. 
 241. Id. at 319. 
 242. Cf. KENNEDY, supra note 194, at 338–39 (“It would have been better if the Court openly 
declared that, for reasons of policy, it declined to grant relief to McCleskey notwithstanding the 
disturbing facts revealed by the Baldus study.”). 
 243. After McCleskey, Congress considered allowing statistical proof to establish a 
presumption of racial discrimination in capital sentencing, but the bill failed. See Racial Justice Act 
of 1989, S. 1696, 101st Cong. § 2922(b)(1) (1989). The state legislative response has been only 
marginally more fruitful. Only Kentucky and North Carolina have signed legislation to permit 
capital defendants to bring challenges of racial discrimination based on statistical evidence. See KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A–2011 to –2012 (2011). The 
difficulty for defendants under the Kentucky statute, moreover, is that it requires them to raise the 
claim before trial and state specifically how the evidence shows that “racial considerations played a 
significant part in the decision to seek a death sentence in his or her case.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
532.300(4) (West 2011). Defendants apparently may only challenge charging decisions and only 
based on evidence of discrimination in the specific prosecutorial district. See Seth Kotch & Robert P. 
Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North 
Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2116 & n.380 (2010). Likewise, the statute requires defendants to 
prove their claims “by clear and convincing evidence.” See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(5) 
(West 2011). The North Carolina Act, adopted in 2009, is more favorable toward capital defendants. 
It allows statistical evidence that does not focus on the particular prosecutorial district, covers not 
only charging decisions, but also prosecutorial peremptory challenges and decisions by juries, and 
imposes on the defense only the preponderance standard of proof. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A–
2011 to –2012 (2011); Kotch & Mosteller, supra, at 2116–18 & nn.380–81. 
 244. Although in terms too brief to be enlightening and in context of a paragraph that muddled 
together the concepts of excessiveness and inconsistency, the McCleskey Court at one point alluded 
to “presumed excessive[ness]” as the explanation for congruence between Furman and modern 
doctrine. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 301. 
 245. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). 
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were disproportional.246 As for William Furman, while his death 
sentence was for murder, he received no chance to present all mitigating 
evidence concerning his character, record, and crime at a separate 
sentencing hearing.247 His trial violated the individualization rule, which 
was announced in the 1976 cases only four years after Furman and 
reiterated in Lockett two years later. Thus, Furman is best understood not 
as a mandate for consistency but as a mandate against retributive excess. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The notion that the Eighth Amendment demands consistency in the 
use of the death penalty dies hard. Rhetoric in some of the crucial 
Furman opinions seemed to call for consistency, and the Court has long 
assured us that the narrowing rule in post-Furman capital-sentencing law 
provides a principled basis for distinguishing the few cases “in which the 
death penalty [is] imposed, from the many cases in which it [is] not.”248 
The Court also appeared to come close to effective abolition of the death 
penalty in McCleskey, in which four Justices were prepared to strike 
down Georgia’s post-Furman death-penalty system because of statistical 
evidence of racially inconsistent outcomes.249 After McCleskey, the 
Court also has maintained the rhetoric that the narrowing requirement in 
capital sentencing exists to “ensure that the death penalty will be 
imposed in a consistent, rational manner.”250 Given all that the Court has 
said and what it almost did in McCleskey, the idea that Furman mandates 
equality is not easily dispelled. 
The hard truth, however, is that the Eighth Amendment, as revealed 
in modern capital-sentencing law, is about one overriding command: the 
government can only impose a death sentence on a person who deserves 
that sanction.251 The idea that consistency is required represents what the 
 
 246. See supra text accompanying notes 136–141. 
 247. See Steiker, supra note 31, at 95. 
 248. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion); Maynard v. 
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988) (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433). 
 249. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Stevens, 
and in all but Part IV–B, Brennan, JJ.). 
 250. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 776 (1990). See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 
436 (2008) (asserting that the narrowing rule serves to “ensure consistency in determining who 
receives a death sentence.”). 
 251. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 10, at 828–35; see also Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the 
Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1203 (2000) (“The Court’s real concern is not equality in 
punishment, but proportionality in punishment.”); McCord, supra note 17, at 548 (“[T]he Court has 
had only one primary goal for its regulation of capital punishment: decreasing overinclusion, with 
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Court has said, and what many believe the Court should enforce through 
abolition, but not what the Court has done. All of the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment doctrine regulating capital sentencing is best explained as an 
effort to prevent undeserved death sentences, and this idea of 
proportionality does not merge with a requirement of consistency. 
The goal of maintaining both robust death-penalty systems and 
consistency in the use of the sanction was always implausible. Modern 
systems retain enormous opportunities for discretionary reprieves.252 
Moreover, in an endeavor as subjective, emotion-laden, and dependent 
on humans253 as determining the deserved punishment for murderers, 
elimination of arbitrary influences, including “irrational sympathies and 
antipathies,” is impossible.254 The idea that a narrowing rule—other than 
one so demanding as to produce effective abolition—could assure 
equality was fantasy. Yet, when the Court approved the resumption of 
capital sentencing in the 1976 cases and asserted that the minimal and 
haphazard narrowing effects in the new statutes could produce 
consistency, observers, and even many of the Justices, seemed 
persuaded. 
The Court should repudiate the narrowing mandate. The requirement 
carries little, if any, meaning, but the continued claim that it produces 
consistency has impeded recognition that individualized consideration is 
the central Eighth Amendment mandate that bears on capital sentencing. 
The individualization rule finds explanation in the same rationale that 
justified the Court in directly limiting death eligibility through its 
proportionality decisions: the deserts limitation. Four decades after 
Furman, if the Court remains unwilling to strike down death-penalty 
 
particular interest in minimizing invidious overinclusion due to racial bias.”); Wilkins, supra note 
135, at 457 (“[W]hen surveying the terrain of all of the Court’s capital Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, one can best impose some kind of order upon the material by viewing it through the 
lens of a deserts-limitation principle.”). Cf. Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment: 
Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REV. 771, 787 (2005) (asserting 
that the concurring Justices in Furman were more concerned about “arbitrariness in an individual 
case” than with “arbitrariness between cases” and thus, “consistency was not, and has not been, the 
Court’s end goal.”). 
 252. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 253. Among many other factors, widely varying competence levels among capital defense 
lawyers contribute greatly to arbitrariness in capital selection. See David R. Dow, Bell v. Cone: The 
Fatal Consequences of Incomplete Failure, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 389, 414 (John H. Blume & 
Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009); Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and 
the Eighth Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1301–02 (1997). 
 254. See BANNER, supra note 5, at 288, 290 (explaining why “the major determinants” of who 
lives and who dies are “not the statutory aggravating . . . circumstances.”). 
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systems that produce unequal outcomes, honesty calls for acknowledging 
the inequality and clarifying that the Eighth Amendment prohibits not 
inconsistency but retributive excess. 
 
 
 
